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SWEPT  AWAY:  SHOULD  COURTS  RETAIN  A
RECKLESSNESS  STANDARD  IN  ASSESSING
RESCUER  INJURY  CLAIMS  UNDER  THE
MARITIME  RESCUE  DOCTRINE?
Anthony Acciaioli*
INTRODUCTION
The Roman poet Ovid once remarked that “the shipwrecked man
shrinks even from calm waters.”1  Indeed, humanity has long respected and
feared the expansive reaches and tremendous power of Earth’s waters.
Ovid’s poignant remark alludes to the sea’s myriad dangers and its ability to
cause injury or death to those who venture out upon it.  While powerful hur-
ricanes, extratropical cyclones, and high surf constitute obvious maritime
hazards,2 secondary hazards such as mechanical failure3 and social hazards
such as piracy4 pose significant danger to life and property.  Despite the sea’s
array of dangers, persons of every level of maritime experience venture out
on its waters to work, conduct research, and partake in recreational activity.
Naturally, with such a diverse group of individuals engaged in maritime activ-
ity, accidents are bound to occur along with a subsequent threat to life and
limb.  Such imperiled individuals often find themselves in need of rescue to
avoid serious injury or even death.
While American tort law has refrained from judicially imposing a univer-
sal duty to rescue upon third parties,5 maritime rescues commonly take place
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Science in
Meteorology and Humanities, Valparaiso University.  I would like to thank Professor Mark
McKenna for advising this Note.  All errors are my own.
1 OVID, EPISTULAE EX PONTO 349 (G.P. Goold ed., Arthur Leslie Wheeler trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1988) (c. 12 A.D.).
2 See generally Weather, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., www.noaa.gov/wx.html
(discussing various meteorological hazards that impact maritime activity).
3 See, e.g., Mariano Castillo, Company: El Faro Skipper Had Plan to Deal with Storm, CNN
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/06/us/el-faro-missing-ship/.
4 See, e.g., Ted Kemp, Crime on the High Seas: The World’s Most Pirated Waters, CNBC
(Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/worlds-most-pirated-waters.html.
5 Yasamine J. Christopherson, Note, The Rescue Doctrine Following the Advent of Compara-
tive Negligence in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 641, 641 (2007); see also Steven J. Heyman,
Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 675–76 (1994) (“[T]he absence of a
duty to rescue remains the general rule in both tort and criminal law.”).  Note, though,
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on a variety of scales in a wide range of circumstances.  Large, governmental
agencies such as the United States Coast Guard often have statutorily man-
dated missions, which impel them to engage in numerous, sometimes highly
technical rescue operations on a frequent basis.6  In 2014 alone, the Coast
Guard responded to 17,508 cases, saving 3443 lives.7  While the Coast Guard
provides its rescuers with highly specialized training in addition to significant
resources,8 many maritime rescue operations are unofficially and voluntarily
initiated by third-party bystanders with little in the way of formal education or
training.  A simple example of such an unofficial rescue operation might be a
nearby individual who renders aid to a family, friend, or stranger in distress.9
However, just because a rescuer lacks a mandate to engage in rescue opera-
tions does not mean he or she will be involved exclusively in small-scale, local
rescue operations.  For example, in 2013, thirty-one-year-old American entre-
preneur and millionaire Christopher Catrambone launched a three-week res-
cue operation aimed at aiding migrants attempting to flee collapsing
dictatorial regimes in Africa and the Middle East.10  Given the rescuers’ vary-
ing degrees of education, experience, and skill, it is inevitable that some res-
cuers will fail to perform their rescues correctly or suffer their own injuries in
the process of rescuing those in peril.
Given that a rescuer may suffer a potentially serious or even fatal injury
in carrying out a rescue mission, it is necessary to ask what if any recourse is
available to provide an injured rescuer or a deceased rescuer’s estate with
adequate redress.  Hoping to incentivize rescue operations by third-party
bystanders11 amidst a backdrop lacking a universal duty to rescue, courts
introduced the rescue doctrine to provide a safety net to would-be rescuers.
With roots extending back to the nineteenth century, the rescue doctrine
that this no-duty rule does not apply to agencies or individuals who are statutorily or con-
tractually mandated to carry out rescue operations (e.g., the United States Coast Guard).
See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 2(4) (2012) (stating that the Coast Guard shall “develop, estab-
lish, maintain, and operate . . . rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and
over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”).
7 U.S. COAST GUARD, SEARCH AND RESCUE SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1964 THRU 2013
(2014), http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/SARfactsInfo/SAR%20Sum%20Stats%2064-
14.pdf.
8 See, e.g., U.S. COAST GUARD, ADDENDUM TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SEARCH
AND RESCUE SUPPLEMENT (2013), http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/manuals/COMDT
INST%20M16130.2F.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Matt Erspamer & Cassy Arsenault, Surfer Reunited with Teen He Rescued from
Lake Michigan, FOX17 (Aug. 21, 2015, 10:05 PM), http://fox17online.com/2015/08/21/
surfer-reunited-with-teen-he-rescued/.
10 Giles Tremlett, The Millionaire Who Rescues Migrants at Sea, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/jul/08/millionaire-who-rescues-migrants-at-sea.
11 See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1089 (4th Cir. 1985)
(arguing in support of a “wanton or reckless” standard as the bar for rescuer recovery
because it is important to “honor attempts to rescue”); Christopherson, supra note 5, at
641 (stating that the rescue doctrine was developed to “encourage third parties to render
aid to those in need”).
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provides access to redress for injured rescuers by refusing to “impute negli-
gence to an effort to preserve [human life], unless made under such circum-
stances as to constitute rashness.”12  Under the rescue doctrine, a “causal
nexus” is established between “the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct [and] the
rescuer’s injuries.”13  Thus, unless a rescuer was rash, as evidenced by “wan-
ton or reckless”14 conduct, he or she would not be barred from obtaining
recovery for his or her injuries from the original tortfeasor owing to a lack of
causation.15  Note, though, the rescue doctrine applies only in cases where
peril is created by another’s negligent act, and not in cases involving an acci-
dent or act of nature.16  Additionally, the rescue doctrine only applies when
there is “a risk of imminent peril to one other than the rescuer.”17  Thus, it is
not a failsafe mechanism for rescuer redress.
In the maritime context, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth18 Circuits have
repeatedly applied the rescue doctrine along with its “wanton or reckless”
standard, reasoning that “of all branches of jurisprudence, the admiralty
must be the one most hospitable to the impulses of man and law to save life
and limb and property.”19  However, in Barlow v. Liberty Maritime Corp., the
Second Circuit explicitly declined to adopt the maritime rescue doctrine and
its associated “wanton or reckless” standard in assessing whether third-mate
George Barlow could recover for injuries he incurred during an attempt to
prevent the Liberty Sun vessel from detaching from its moorings.20  Instead,
the Barlow court reasoned that George Barlow should be held to the standard
of a “reasonable seaman” or “reasonable mariner” under the circumstances,
thus declining to apply the maritime rescue doctrine.21  While the “reasona-
12 Furka, 755 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 227 A.2d 751,
753–54 (Md. 1967)).
13 Christopherson, supra note 5, at 642 (quoting Estate of Solomon v. Shuell, 457
N.W.2d 669, 683 (Mich. 1990)).
14 Furka, 755 F.2d at 1088.
15 Id.
16 See Christopher H. White, Comment, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Case for
Reform of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 521 (2002) (noting that the rescue
doctrine does not provide an avenue for recovery when “the dangerous situation was
caused by accident or by an act of nature”).
17 25 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES,
AND DAMAGES § 119.02(1)(a) (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2015).
18 Wharf v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 60 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1995), takes place
outside the maritime context; however, owing to its express reliance on Furka, a maritime
rescue doctrine case, in reaching its conclusion that a “wanton or reckless” standard should
apply in determining whether an injured rescuer may recover, it is viewed as part of the
broader circuit split respecting the doctrine. See Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d
518, 525 (2d Cir. 2014) (pointing out that the Ninth Circuit has explicitly followed Furka in
the context of a discussion as to whether the Second Circuit should adopt its rule).
19 Furka, 755 F.2d at 1089 (quoting Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc., 412
F.2d 1011, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969)); see also Wharf, 60 F.3d at 635; Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line,
Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980); Asaro v. Parisi, 297 F.2d 859 (1st Cir. 1962).
20 746 F.3d 518, 526–28 (2d Cir. 2014).
21 Id. at 527.
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ble seaman” standard “recogniz[es] that mariners may have particular skills
for responding to emergencies,”22 it is explicitly and clearly distinguished
from the traditional maritime rescue doctrine thus leading to a circuit split
between the Second Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.23
This Note asserts that courts should continue to apply the traditional
maritime rescue doctrine along with its “wanton or reckless” standard when
assessing whether a rescuer injured during a maritime rescue attempt stem-
ming from a negligent tortfeasor’s conduct may recover for his or her inju-
ries.  Part I will analyze the arc of rescue doctrine–related case law
surrounding the aforementioned circuit split, scrutinizing how the rescue
doctrine has been impacted by the larger-scale paradigm shift in apportion-
ing liability from contributory negligence to comparative negligence.  Part II
will discuss the circuit split directly and argue that in light of admiralty law’s
historical and statutory commitment to encouraging nearby seafarers to aid
those in peril despite no broad, universal tort law duty to rescue, it is consis-
tent and appropriate to preserve the traditional maritime rescue doctrine.
Finally, Part III will discuss important policy considerations favoring a “wan-
ton or reckless” standard of care in the maritime rescue context, including
both incentivizing life-saving rescue attempts and properly allocating costs
under principles of law and economics.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESCUE DOCTRINE: A CASE LAW STUDY
In beginning, it is important to delineate the rescue doctrine’s precise
function amidst the broader tort law landscape.  While some jurisdictions
have enacted Good Samaritan statutes, which may immunize potential rescu-
ers from civil liability arising from negligent rescue attempts,24 the tradi-
tional rescue doctrine is a creature of common law.25  Also distinguishing it
from Good Samaritan statutes is the rescue doctrine’s focus not on immuniz-
ing rescuers from civil liability arising from injuries done to rescuees as a
result of negligent rescue attempts, but rather on providing a potential rem-
edy for a rescuer’s own injuries.26  The doctrine operates on two levels, both
of which ensure that an injured rescuer has a legitimate opportunity to
recover.  Specifically, when a perilous situation results from a tortfeasor’s
negligent conduct, the rescue doctrine acts to both establish a “causal nexus”
between a tortfeasor’s negligence and a rescuer’s injuries27 and to allow a
22 Id.
23 Circuit Splits, Standard of Care—Maritime Rescue Doctrine: Barlow v. Liberty Mar.
Corp., 11 SETON HALL. CIR. REV. 150, 151 (2014) [hereinafter Standard of Care].
24 See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good
Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1989).
25 See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985)
(describing the rescue doctrine as “[t]he common law doctrine of rescue”).
26 See Christopherson, supra note 5, at 641–43 (introducing the rescue doctrine and
accentuating its focus on the rescuer’s injuries).
27 Id. at 642; see also Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App.
1964) (“[T]he chain of causation remains intact, since it is reasonably to be anticipated
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rescuer an opportunity to recover in full unless his or her rescue attempt was
undertaken “recklessly or rashly.”28
Before delving into relevant case law, it is important to note that the
common law rescue doctrine arose during a time at which contributory negli-
gence was the prevailing regime under which courts apportioned liability.29
Under contributory negligence, “[a]n injured plaintiff was unable to
recover—and the defendant went unpunished—even if the plaintiff’s actions
were much less blameworthy than those of the defendant.”30  Thus, as an
examination of the case law will reveal, one original impetus underlying judi-
cial development of a rescue doctrine was to provide a sort of escape hatch
through which injured rescuers could recover despite bearing a degree of
fault for their injuries, wholly barring them from redress under traditional
doctrinal principles of contributory negligence.31  One pivotal question,
however, is whether case law suggests that contributory negligence’s seminal
role in the rescue doctrine’s origination renders it redundant in an era
marked by a comparative negligence approach to the apportionment of lia-
bility.  This Part argues that while concerns over contributory negligence
undoubtedly catalyzed judicial development of a rescue doctrine, early case
law and its progeny evince a more fundamental commitment to developing a
distinct tort law carve-out aimed at providing injured rescuers with a liberal
opportunity to be made whole in addition to incentivizing bystanders to aid
those who are imperiled.  As such, this Part claims that a shift from contribu-
tory to comparative negligence does not necessarily render a traditional
application of the rescue doctrine superfluous because comparative negli-
gence fails to address these fundamental concerns sufficiently.
that, once such peril to life or property is initiated and brought into being by the negli-
gence of a defendant, reasonable attempts will be undertaken to alleviate and nullify the
consequences of such peril.”).
28 Jennifer A. Noya, Note, The Application of the Rescue Doctrine Under Comparative Negli-
gence Principles: Govich v. North American Systems, Inc., 23 N.M. L. REV. 349, 353 (1993).
29 See Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing the
rescue doctrine’s roots in concerns over a plaintiff’s potential inability to recover if faced
with contributory negligence).
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., id. (“Although courts applying the doctrine of contributory negligence may
have been willing to deny recovery to a person whose negligence precipitated an emer-
gency, they hesitated before applying it to someone who voluntarily exposed himself to
danger in order to rescue others from it.  To protect would-be rescuers, courts created the
rescue doctrine.”); see also Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Rescue Doctrine: Applicability and
Application of Comparative Negligence Principles, 75 A.L.R. 4th 875, § 1 (1989) (“The purpose
of the rescue doctrine when it was first created was to avoid having a plaintiff be found
contributorily negligent as a matter of law when he voluntarily placed himself in a perilous
position to prevent another person from suffering serious injury or death . . . .”).
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A. Rescue Doctrine Case Law in the Era of Contributory Negligence
One of the earliest formulations of the rescue doctrine is found in Eckert
v. Long Island Railroad Co.,32 decided in 1871.  In the case, the plaintiff’s hus-
band was killed when he ran out onto a set of train tracks to save a small child
who was likely to be struck by an incoming, negligently speeding train.33  In
the New York Supreme Court, counsel for the Long Island Railroad con-
tended that the plaintiff’s husband negligently and “voluntarily placed him-
self in peril from which he received the injury,” thus precluding his estate
from recovering.34  On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision, in which the jury determined that Mr. Eckert’s actions
did not constitute negligence and thus did not bar his estate from recover-
ing.35  The court held that “[t]he law has so high a regard for human life that
it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under
such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent per-
sons.”36  The Eckert court never explicitly mentioned avoiding contributory
negligence’s potentially harsh consequences as a justification for implement-
ing the rescue doctrine; however, it did point out that “[f]or a person
engaged in his ordinary affairs,” it traditionally constituted negligence and
thus barred recovery if one “knowingly and voluntarily [placed] himself in a
position where he [was] liable to receive a serious injury.”37  Certainly, avoid-
ing such a finding of contributory negligence was essential if Mr. Eckert’s
estate was to potentially recover; however, some scholars have accentuated
the court’s broader, more fundamental aim that Mr. Eckert’s “heroic effort”
be recognized even if it “trumped application of the law.”38  In subsequent
decades, courts continued to follow Eckert’s approach, routinely applying the
rescue doctrine to allow plaintiffs to recover in cases where contributory neg-
ligence would ordinarily forbid recovery, while simultaneously exhibiting a
broader commitment to affirming communal mores tilted towards recogniz-
ing and honoring efforts to save human life.39
32 43 N.Y. 502 (N.Y. 1871).
33 Id. at 503–04.
34 Id. at 504.
35 Id. at 506.
36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 Id. With this language, the Eckert court differentiates instances of ordinary negli-
gence as well as “the mere protection of property” from special cases in which human life is
at stake. Id.  It is this latter subset of cases where a rescuer’s voluntary, potentially negli-
gent (according to traditional principles of tort law) “exposure” to danger is not a prohibi-
tive bar to recovery unless the “exposure” is deemed “rash or reckless.” Id.
38 Amelia H. Ashton, Note, Rescuing the Hero: The Ramifications of Expanding the Duty to
Rescue on Society and the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 69, 94 (2009); see also Jay Tidmarsh, A Process
Theory of Torts, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1313, 1383 & n.247 (1994) (“The jury [in Eckert]
refused to find that the decedent was contributorily negligent, and the New York Court of
Appeals refused to overturn that finding.  Such a heroic effort was clearly worthy of com-
munity approbation in spite of the foreseeability of death.”).
39 See, e.g., Gibney v. State, 33 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1893); Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorff,
28 N.E. 172 (Ohio 1891).
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In Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney,40 the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a
particularly strong opinion affirming the rescue doctrine.  In the case, plain-
tiff John Marney was seriously injured when he attempted to plug a tap hole
that was oozing molten metal due to the negligence of a substitute
employee.41  Applying the rescue doctrine, the court declared that Mr. Mar-
ney could not be held contributorily negligent unless his rescue attempt was
conducted in a rash or reckless manner.42  However, it was the court’s lan-
guage in reaching this conclusion that was particularly telling.  It concluded:
“The plaintiff in this case, though moving in a humble sphere, has given an
example of genuine and heroic manhood, and has demonstrated that in his
estimation ‘the duties of life are more than life.’”43  Here, the court’s moral-
istic, almost transcendental language speaks not simply to an unwillingness to
apply principles of contributory negligence in the province of rescue; but
more precisely, the court’s reasoning resonates with a fundamental desire to
preserve every possible avenue for recovery when a bystander risks his or her
life for the safety of others.  Nevertheless, this language is both dicta and
subject to interpretation, and thus a question remains as to whether in a
modern day comparative negligence regime, Mr. Marney would have faced a
reduced recovery or whether the court would have refused to reduce his
recovery under a strict application of the rescue doctrine.
Still firmly anchored in an era of contributory negligence, Wagner v.
International Railway Co., decided in 1921, offers further insight into this
important question.44  This paradigmatic, seminal case centered on Herbert
Wagner, who, while voluntarily attempting to rescue his cousin after he fell
out of a railway car left open, lost his footing and subsequently injured him-
self.45  Stating that “[d]anger invites rescue,” Justice Cardozo noted that
“wrong to [an] imperiled victim . . . is a wrong also to his rescuer.”46  He
clarified this relationship by noting that “[t]he risk of rescue, if only it be not
wanton, is born of the occasion.  The emergency begets the man.  The wrong-
doer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer.  He is accountable as
if he had.”47  Determining that the lower court improperly instructed the
jury on the role of a rescuer in an emergency situation and the subsequent
standard for rescuer recovery, the court remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with his opinion.48
Justice Cardozo’s opinion is instructive in a couple of respects.  First, by
asserting that the risk of rescue is “if only it be not wanton . . . born of the
40 42 A. 60 (Md. 1898).
41 Id. at 61–62.
42 Id. at 66.
43 Id.
44 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
45 Id. at 437.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
48 Id.
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occasion,”49 Justice Cardozo arguably reaffirms the “rash and reckless” stan-
dard employed in assessing rescuer fault under the rescue doctrine as it was
articulated by Eckert and other early cases.50  More importantly, however, Jus-
tice Cardozo’s opinion offers some hints as to how Wagner may have been
decided had comparative negligence been in place at the time.  Specifically,
Justice Cardozo’s statement that “the emergency begets the man,” coupled
with his description of the rescuer as a “deliverer,” offers further insight into
whether a standard of comparative negligence should in fact subsume the
traditional rescue doctrine.51  Justice Cardozo’s language seems to suggest
more than a mere desire to avoid a finding of contributory negligence;
rather, his wording assumes a transformative character, hinting at a deeper,
more moralistic intention to “beget” and establish a fuller, more complete
carve-out aimed at offering rescuers maximal opportunity to recover despite
tort law’s broader restrictions on duty and liability.  In fact, some scholars
have suggested that at its core, Wagner is not focused microscopically on
issues of apportioning fault but rather centers on ensuring that rescuers are
made completely whole, owing to their heroic actions despite the nuances of
tort law.52  Such interpretations would seem to militate against arguments
that Justice Cardozo would rule differently amidst a regime of comparative
negligence.  These arguments are particularly persuasive in light of Justice
Cardozo’s collective, welfarist view of common law.53  Such an approach sug-
gests that Cardozo would hesitate to impinge on rescuers’ ability to recover
fully for their injuries, given that doing so would not fully honor their selfless
commitment to community.  Cardozo’s ethos is also consistent with both Eck-
ert and Marney, cases that utilized similarly ethical language in reaching pro-
rescuer results.
49 Id.
50 See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985)
(characterizing Wagner as one example in a long line of cases requiring “wanton or reck-
less” behavior on a rescuer’s part before any fault may be assigned); see also Christopher M.
Hohn, Note, The Missouri Firefighter’s Rule: Gray v. Russell, 59 MO. L. REV. 479, 483 n.31
(1994) (citing Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437–38, for the proposition that so long as a rescue is
not “wanton,” a rescuer is deemed a foreseeable plaintiff for proximate cause purposes).
But see Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 527 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that Justice
Cardozo was actually applying a reasonableness standard because he makes the “‘wanton’
reference when discussing the ‘normal’ and ‘probable’ urge to rescue,” and “[t]hese words
[are] associated with a reasonableness standard”).
51 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 438 (emphasis added).
52 See Ross A. Albert, Comment, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers of Human Life, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 85, 92–93 (1986) (“Wagner and its progeny represent a transformation in the
doctrine of contributory negligence through expansion of traditional notions of foresee-
ability and causation in order to reach a fair result on the ultimate question of recovery for
rescuers.”).
53 See John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing
Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1335 (1990) (“[Cardozo] not only
thought that the common law reflects and enforces community standards of obligation; he
felt that it ought to.”).
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Ex post, Justice Cardozo was concerned with ensuring that injured rescu-
ers have a fair opportunity to be made whole for injuries suffered during a
rescue attempt.  However, his language also suggests he held a broader ex
ante concern, namely, incentivizing bystanders and third parties to engage in
rescue operations.  Cardozo’s opinion begins with what is now a famous
maxim: “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to
relief.”54  Courts and scholars alike have long interpreted Cardozo’s words to
be aimed at encouraging bystanders to aid injured and imperiled victims.55
The significance of any impact wrought by a shift to comparative negli-
gence is thus best viewed against this clearly articulated policy goal of paving
a wide path designed to invite bystanders to engage in rescue.  Considering
Wagner from this angle, any attempt to place an obstacle in front of a would-
be rescuer could be said to frustrate its broader policy goals.  Specifically,
applying principles of comparative negligence to a rescue attempt could
allow for a rescuer’s recovery to be docked according to his or her degree of
responsibility for any injuries sustained.56  This in turn might lead a would-be
rescuer to conclude that it is better to refrain from offering assistance lest he
or she not be fully compensated for any potential injuries.  Admittedly, it is
unlikely that a bystander faced with an emergent and imminent crisis decides
to react or not to react based upon an ex ante consideration of the relevant
legal standard.57  Theoretically, however, for reasons mentioned above, a
comparative negligence standard (as opposed to a recklessness standard)
would seem to exert a greater chilling effect on an individual’s willingness to
intervene in a situation in which his or her own physical or emotional wellbe-
ing may be threatened.  Empirical support for this proposition is limited;
however, some modern courts have voiced a similar concern in the context of
the rescue doctrine.58  At the least, it is certainly possible that a greater num-
ber of would-be rescuers may be deterred from rendering aid to an individ-
ual in need amidst a regime of comparative negligence.  It is difficult to
54 Wagner, 133 N.E. at 437.
55 See Spencer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820 (S.D. Ind. 2005)
(discussing Wagner and noting that Justice Cardozo’s language reflects an expectation and
even a “hope” that one would aid an injured victim and that Indiana public policy should
take that into account); see also Albert, supra note 52, at 92 (“Wagner and its associated
cases reflect the assumption that rescue is a commendable human urge to be encouraged,
not penalized.”).
56 See Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 528 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[E]ven if the
rescuer acts unreasonably, he can still recover in proportion to his caution . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
57 See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
1535, 1536 (2005) (“[I]t is commonly accepted that very few people know much about
what the laws say . . . .”).
58 See Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 640 (Kan. 1989) (“An abrogation of the rescue
doctrine would tend to operate as a deterrent to potential rescuers and penalize acts which
would constitute ordinary negligence, but would not rise to the level of rash conduct.  Such
a holding would be one more weapon in the arsenal of the ‘don’t-get-involved’ creed of
citizenship which is already too prevalent.”).
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harmonize such a consequence with Wagner’s policy goal of freely incentiviz-
ing rescues.
B. The Turning Tide: The Impact of Comparative Negligence on Rescue Doctrine
Case Law
While Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Wagner is suggestive of a broader
desire to develop a distinct carve-out aimed at protecting rescuers and incen-
tivizing bystanders to render aid, it remains unclear whether Cardozo would
in fact have reached a similar result under a comparative negligence regime.
As comparative negligence began to predominate, many courts directly ques-
tioned whether a traditional understanding of the rescue doctrine remained
appropriate.  Thus far, two camps have emerged with respect to how compar-
ative negligence affects traditional common law formulations of the rescue
doctrine.  One argues that comparative negligence has subsumed the rescue
doctrine because under comparative negligence principles, an injured but
negligent rescuer may still recover in proportion to his or her responsibility
for any injuries suffered.  Contrarily, others argue comparative negligence
impermissibly impinges upon a rescuer’s access to redress—thus claiming
that a traditional, common law understanding of the rescue doctrine should
be maintained.59
In Sweetman v. State Highway Department,60 the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered whether traditional rescue doctrine principles still applied to an
accident on an icy overpass.  In Sweetman, plaintiff Rosalyce Sweetman was
severely injured when a car lost control and struck her while she was render-
ing aid to another motorist.61  Sweetman argued that she was engaged in a
rescue and that her injuries resulted from the defective design of the over-
pass, which was not properly suited to icy conditions.62  Because she was
engaged in a rescue, Ms. Sweetman contended that principles of comparative
negligence should not apply to her.63  The court concluded that rescue doc-
trine principles still applied with respect to establishing proximate cause.64
However, in addressing the allocation of responsibility, the court stated that
“since allocation of negligence to the plaintiff under a system of comparative
negligence is not a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery, the second attribute of the
rescue doctrine is no longer compelling.”65  Elaborating, the court explained
that it perceived no “harsh result” in applying comparative negligence.66  It
59 See Christopherson, supra note 5, at 650 (“The rescue doctrine could interact with
comparative negligence in two distinct ways.  A . . . court could rule that the Wagner stan-
dard should continue as an independent standard of care . . . . Or, a court may rule that
comparative negligence has subsumed the rescue doctrine.”).
60 357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
61 Id. at 786.
62 Id. at 786–88.
63 Id. at 788.
64 Id. at 789.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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ultimately remanded Ms. Sweetman’s case, with instructions to follow princi-
ples of comparative negligence in assessing Ms. Sweetman’s potential
recovery.67
Cords v. Anderson68 is another case in which comparative negligence was
found to subsume traditional rescue doctrine principles.  In Cords, plaintiffs
Jane Cords and Sue Henry fell down a jagged rock formation while trying to
rescue a friend, Norina Boyle.69  Plaintiffs contended that Ms. Boyle fell due
to negligence on behalf of park manager Floyd K. Anderson, specifically
pointing to his failure to notify superiors about a hazardous drop-off along
their hiking trail.70  Ms. Cords was permanently paralyzed as a result of her
fall, and Ms. Henry also sustained serious injuries.71  Here, the court again
applied the first aspect of the rescue doctrine; however, with respect to the
second, the court held that “a rescuer is not negligent where the rescue,
although dangerous, is not unreasonable or unreasonably carried out.”72  Fur-
ther elaborating, the court explained:
In a comparative negligence jurisdiction such as Wisconsin, if the trier of
fact finds that the rescue is unreasonable or unreasonably carried out the
fact finder should then make a comparison of negligence between the res-
cuer and the one whose negligence created the situation to which the rescue
was a response.73
Thus, like in Sweetman, the court effectively abrogated the “wanton or
reckless” standard traditionally associated with application of the rescue
doctrine.
Under Sweetman, Cords, and other similar cases,74 a plaintiff faced with
life-altering and extremely expensive injuries emanating from a rescue
attempt may find himself or herself financially responsible for a portion of
those injuries if a jury finds unreasonability under the circumstances.  Such a
result is disconcerting when it is viewed against earlier decisions such as
Maryland Steel and Wagner.  In both cases, a core aim was to ensure rescuers a
genuine opportunity to be made whole.75  For example, it seems hard to
imagine that Justice Cardozo, characterizing rescuers as “deliverer[s],”76
would modify his holding in Wagner to allow for allocation of responsibility
based upon principles of comparative negligence if it would leave a freely
acting rescuer like Jane Cords with potentially significant and crippling finan-
67 Id. at 790.
68 259 N.W.2d 672 (Wis. 1977).
69 Id. at 676–77.
70 Id. at 678.
71 Id. at 677.
72 Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Estate of Solomon v. Shuell, 420 N.W.2d 160 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Dehn v. Otter Tail
Power Co., 251 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1977).
75 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
76 Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921).
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cial responsibility for her paralyzing injuries.  Again, such an assertion is par-
ticularly compelling in light of Cardozo’s characterization of the common
law as a tool for judges to encourage moral development in society.77
In light of comparative negligence, many courts have in fact repudiated
the “wanton or reckless” standard traditionally associated with the rescue
doctrine; however, some courts have affirmatively refused to do so, instead
adhering to a more traditional interpretation.  In Bridges v. Bentley,78 the Kan-
sas Supreme Court refused to abrogate the rescue doctrine’s “rash and reck-
less” standard, arguing it was not subsumed by principles of comparative
negligence.79  In Bridges, Mr. Mark Bridges was struck by a pickup truck while
aiding victims of a previous auto accident.80  He suffered severe injuries
including a head injury as a result of this impact.81  Appellant, Icy Bentley,
claimed that a recently enacted statute espousing principles of comparative
negligence eliminated any need for a traditional rescue doctrine in Kansas.82
The court vigorously disagreed, finding “no reason to believe the legislature
intended to abrogate the rescue doctrine in enacting the comparative negli-
gence statute.”83  In explaining its decision, the court noted that it “remains
sound policy to encourage rescue efforts,” and that “[a]n abrogation of the
rescue doctrine would tend to operate as a deterrent to potential rescuers
and penalize acts which would constitute ordinary negligence, but would not
rise to the level of rash conduct.”84
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached a similar result in Ouellette v.
Carde.85  In Ouellette, plaintiff Ms. Beverly Ouellette suffered severe burns
when she attempted to aid her neighbor, Mr. Oren Carde, who, due to his
77 In describing his view of common law, Judge Benjamin Cardozo remarked that
judges should “follow, or strive to follow, the principle and practice of the men and women
of the community whom the social mind would rank as intelligent and virtuous.” BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 273 (1928) (emphasis added).  Cardozo’s
statement once again reflects his moralistic, welfarist view of the common law.  As John
C.P. Goldberg notes, “[t]he moralistic strain in some of Cardozo’s decisions can then be
explained by his belief that moralistic rules would assist litigants and the general populace
in attaining a higher level of personal moral development.”  Goldberg, supra note 53, at
1339 (discussing Cardozo scholar Stanley Brubaker’s analysis of the moralistic strain in
some of Cardozo’s judicial opinions).  Certainly, neither Cardozo’s own words nor
Goldberg’s analysis speak directly to Cardozo’s ruling in Wagner.  However, assuming a
bystander who willingly risks his or her own safety to aid another in peril is someone to be
characterized as moral and virtuous, Cardozo’s broader common law views seem difficult
to square with a legal approach that may leave an injured rescuer with a devastating finan-
cial burden on top of his or her physical injuries.  Additionally, such a law is likely to
disincentivize moral rescue operations going forward.
78 769 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1989).
79 Id. at 640.
80 Id. at 637.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 638.
83 Id. at 639.
84 Id. at 640.
85 612 A.2d 687 (R.I. 1992).
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own negligence, had become trapped under a car.86  Ms. Ouellette suffered
these burns when gasoline on the floor of defendant Carde’s garage ignited
as she electronically opened his garage door.87  While Ms. Ouellette was
clearly engaged in a rescue operation, Carde nevertheless claimed that Ms.
Ouellette’s damages should have been reduced in proportion to her level of
fault in accord with principles of comparative negligence.88  Notwithstanding
comparative negligence’s potential benefits to would-be rescuers,89 the Ouel-
lette court concluded that despite a “split in authority,” the “comparative-neg-
ligence doctrine does not fully protect the rescue doctrine’s underlying
policy of promoting rescue.”90  As the court noted, there is nothing other
than a bystander’s “moral conscience” to incentivize rescue amidst a no-duty
rule; and “one who voluntarily attempts to save a life of another should not
be barred from complete recovery.”91  The court concluded that this is true
unless a rescuer is “rash or reckless.”92  Finally, in adopting its reasoning, the
Ouellette court channeled Judge Cardozo, referencing that his “oft quoted
words . . . apply now as they did in 1921.”93
Collectively, an examination of rescue doctrine case law leaves a signifi-
cant degree of ambiguity as to whether principles of comparative negligence
have abrogated a traditional understanding of the doctrine.  However, a
close reading of Eckert, Wagner, and their progeny reveals that while contribu-
tory negligence’s prohibitive effects on rescuer recovery undoubtedly cata-
lyzed judicial development of a rescue doctrine, a much broader carve-out
ultimately emerged.  Concerned both with providing rescuers a genuine
opportunity to be made whole and incentivizing private rescue, courts
broadly and deliberately exempted rescuers from traditional tort law princi-
ples of causation, foreseeability, and reasonableness.94  Given this, it seems
highly likely that rescue doctrine principles are “more than a vestige of con-
tributory negligence.”95  The rescue doctrine’s twin aims argue against its
clear abrogation in light of comparative negligence; and, as Part II argues,
abrogating its protection for rescuers would be particularly problematic in a
maritime context.
86 Id. at 688–89.
87 Id. at 689.
88 Id.
89 Id. (“Comparative fault removes the harsh consequences of contributory negligence
because a rescuer is not barred completely from recovery for negligently performing a
rescue.”).
90 Id. at 690.
91 Id. (emphasis added).
92 Id.
93 Id. (citing Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co. 133 N.E. 437, 437–38 (N.Y. 1932)).
94 See supra note 50.
95 Anita Bernstein, The Communities that Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 735, 767 n.143 (2002) (“The rescue rule has been reaffirmed in the comparative fault
era, suggesting (once again) that lenient treatment of a class of plaintiffs is more than a
vestige of contributory negligence.”).
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II. INCENTIVIZING MARITIME RESCUES: A HIGH STAKES DECISION
Part I traced some 120 years of rescue doctrine–related case law to ana-
lyze its relationship to shifting principles of apportionment.  As Part I argued,
while ambiguity exists as to whether comparative negligence has subsumed
the rescue doctrine, an integrated study of relevant case law militates against
such an argument.  This Part contends that an abrogation of the rescue doc-
trine and its associated “wanton or reckless” standard for rescuer recovery
would be particularly inappropriate and ill-advised in an admiralty and mari-
time context and that a “wanton or reckless” standard should be maintained.
While land-based rescues are most common and many rescue doc-
trine–related cases feature land-based scenarios, the classic tort law rescue
doctrine applies across a wide range of environments, including both sky and
sea.  At sea, classic rescue doctrine principles are embodied in what is termed
the maritime rescue doctrine.96  Traditionally, like its parent, this maritime
permutation of the rescue doctrine both establishes a causal nexus between a
tortfeasor’s negligence and a rescuer’s injuries and allows a rescuer to
recover unless his actions were “wanton or reckless.”97  However, just as
within broader rescue doctrine case law, this traditional “wanton or reckless”
standard has come under fire in light of a shift from contributory to compar-
ative negligence.98  Today, this barrage has culminated in a split between the
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, which have retained a “wanton and reck-
less” standard, and the Second Circuit, which in Barlow v. Liberty Maritime
Corp.99 adopted a “reasonable mariner” standard.100  In adopting a “reasona-
ble mariner” standard, the Second Circuit effectively abrogated traditional
maritime rescue doctrine principles by asserting that a recklessness standard
was inappropriate in light of a shift to comparative negligence in apportion-
ing liability.101  In light of this divergence, it becomes crucial to analyze
which standard more appropriately reflects maritime rescue doctrine aims.
Before addressing unique attributes of admiralty and maritime law support-
ive of a “wanton or reckless” standard for rescuer recovery, it is essential to
examine the contours of the circuit split itself in order to lay out relevant
battle lines.
A. Application of the Maritime Rescue Doctrine: The Circuit Split
In Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc.,102 the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered whether a maritime rescuer’s own negligence should bar his estate
from recovering for his death.  Despite being decided against a backdrop of
96 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (2d Cir. 2014).
97 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088–89 (4th Cir. 1985).
98 See id. at 1088 (discussing the contention that the rise of comparative negligence
has diminished the force of the traditional rescue doctrine).
99 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 527.
100 See Standard of Care, supra note 23, at 150.
101 See Barlow, 746 F.3d at 527–28.
102 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969).
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contributory as opposed to comparative negligence, Grigsby laid down an
approach strongly supportive of a “wanton or reckless” standard.  In the case,
John D. Grigsby, a plant guard for Olin Matheson, perished when he
attempted to rescue a ship repairer who had fallen and seriously injured him-
self in a barge’s wing tank.103  Substantively, Grigsby’s estate asserted his
death was proximately and vicariously caused by both Coastal Marine Service,
Inc., and Welders Supply Co., owing to actions taken on their behalf by ill-
trained and inexperienced employees, one of whom was seriously injured,
precipitating Grigsby’s rescue attempt.104  Specifically, Grigsby died because
he slipped and fell, became unconscious, and subsequently inhaled a lethal
quantity of carbon monoxide from within the tank.105  Grigsby’s estate con-
tended his death was a direct and proximate result of both: (a) Coastal’s
employees’ failure to warn him of dangerous conditions including potentially
lethal levels of gas within the tank; and (b) Welders’s failure to inform its
own employee, Sonnier, who was injured in the tank, of potential dangers
associated with tank entry.106  Appellants, Coastal and Welders, rebutted that
Grigsby’s estate should bear responsibility for his own passing due to his fail-
ure to act prudently in attempting to rescue Sonnier.107
In addressing Appellants’ claims, Judge John Robert Brown, a former
eminent admiralty lawyer, ultimately concluded that Grigsby could not be
held liable for his injuries and that his culpability for them failed to rise to an
actionable level under applicable standards.108  Judge Brown began by focus-
ing on admiralty law’s unique nature and its particular preference for incen-
tivizing rescues.  He asserted that “[f]or of all branches of jurisprudence, the
admiralty must be the one most hospitable to the impulses of man and law to
save life and limb and property.”109  Characterizing Grigsby as a “maritime
life salvor,” Judge Brown noted that “[m]aritime law in every way and in every
context encourages the salvor to salve—to save.”110  Judge Brown noted that
many arguments raised by Coastal and Welders, which may have possessed a
degree of force in a land-based context, lost considerable strength because
they were made in a maritime arena.111  Specifically turning to Grigsby’s pur-
ported negligence, Judge Brown noted that “the law accords a considerable
latitude in the standard of performance of the salvage service.”112  He then
stated that “[t]he salvor is seldom held liable for just a failure to save and
liability for negligent salvage is limited to situations in which the salvor,
103 Id. at 1015.
104 Id. at 1016–20.
105 Id. at 1019–20.
106 See id. at 1033–37.
107 Id. at 1021–23.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1021.
110 Id. at 1021–22 (emphases added).
111 Id. at 1022.
112 Id. at 1021.
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through want of due care, has worsened the position of the victim,” before dis-
missing appellants’ claims that Grigsby was contributorily negligent.113
In so holding, Grigsby repudiates an ordinary negligence standard for
rescuer liability.  While its precise focus is on salvage law and the Good
Samaritan doctrine, Grigsby nevertheless sets a high bar for rescuer fault in
applicable situations, including application of the maritime rescue doctrine.
In Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,114 the Ninth Circuit, commenting on Grigsby,
noted that the case rejected a negligence standard115 and proceeded to link
Grigsby and Furka, noting that it agrees with them and holds that “a rescuer
will be held liable only (1) for negligent conduct that worsens the position of
the victim or (2) for reckless and wanton conduct in performing the res-
cue.”116 Barlow itself, which ultimately split from Grigsby and Furka, noted
when discussing the maritime rescue doctrine and its “wanton or reckless”
standard that “the Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar rule,” and then pro-
ceeded to cite Grigsby.117  Thus, while Judge Brown never explicitly refer-
ences a “wanton or reckless” standard for rescuer recovery, many courts have
read Grigsby as a seminal case affirming such an approach in light of mari-
time law’s unique orientation with respect to incentivizing third-party rescue
operations.
Moving to 1985, the Fourth Circuit had occasion to consider a claim
parallel to that in Grigsby.  In the oft-referenced and paradigmatic case of
Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,118 the Fourth Circuit directly
addressed the maritime rescue doctrine and what relevance its “wanton or
reckless” standard retained in light of principles of comparative negligence.
In Furka, Paul Furka died when his sixteen-foot Boston Whaler sank in frigid
January seas as he attempted to rescue a scowman from a stranded tug-
boat.119  Deborah Furka, suing on behalf of Paul Furka’s estate, claimed his
death resulted from Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.’s negligence in order-
ing him and his small Boston Whaler to assist the stranded tug and scow
despite knowledge of perilous weather conditions.120
In addressing appellant Great Lakes’ claim that Furka’s estate should be
barred from complete recovery under principles of comparative negligence,
Judge Wilkinson began by reaffirming bedrock rescue doctrine principles.
Quoting a long line of cases, Judge Wilkinson wrote, “The law has so high a
regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to pre-
113 Id. at 1021–24 (emphases added).
114 759 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1985).
115 Id. at 1429 (citing Grigsby, 412 F.2d at 1021–22).
116 Id. at 1430.
117 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2014).
118 755 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1985).
119 Id. at 1087.  A scowman is an individual who works on a flat-bottomed boat. Scow-
man, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004), http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/scowman.
120 Furka, 755 F.2d at 1087–88.
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serve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness.”121
Then Judge Wilkinson addressed what if any role comparative negligence has
played in abrogating a “rashness” or “wanton or reckless” standard.  Judge
Wilkinson acknowledged that a degree of ambiguity existed as to whether
comparative negligence had subsumed the rescue doctrine in land-based
contexts.  Observing comparative negligence’s ameliorative effects on a res-
cuer’s ability to recover despite some potential degree of culpability, he
noted that “[i]n some comparative negligence jurisdictions . . . the wanton
and reckless standard has thus been diluted.”122  However, he quickly noted
that such is not an “appropriate” course in admiralty because “[the court]
agree[s] with the Fifth Circuit [Grigsby] that ‘of all branches of jurispru-
dence, the admiralty must be the one most hospitable to the impulses of man
and law to save life and limb and property.’”123  The Furka court’s agreement
rested on a belief that “[t]he best traditions of seafaring men demand that we
honor attempts to rescue, unless the rescuer acts beyond the bounds that
even the exigencies of the moment would allow.”124  Doing so is crucial,
Judge Wilkinson reasoned, because “[l]aw must encourage an environment
where human instinct is not insular but responds to the plight of another in
peril.”125
Furka’s holding that a “wanton or reckless” standard is most appropriate
because it honors admiralty law’s historical commitment to rescue and sal-
vage coupled with its role in incentivizing rescue operations and aligns with
earlier, land-based rescue doctrine cases including both Maryland Steel and
Wagner.  In both Maryland Steel and Wagner, an ex post concern was that an
injured rescuer be given a full opportunity to be made whole just as one
concern in Furka was “avoid[ing] a total defeat of recovery under common
law.”126  Yet, an equally important, ex ante concern in all three cases was
setting a precedent likely to encourage and promote rescue attempts by third
parties.127  Channeling this tradition, Furka firmly reaffirms the “wanton or
121 Id. at 1088 (quoting Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 227 A.2d 751, 753–54 (Md.
1967)).  The Scott case itself quotes Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney, 42 A. 60, 66 (Md. 1898),
which was discussed in Part I.  The Furka court’s citation to Maryland Steel lends further
support to the proposition that its holding was more than a mere repudiation of contribu-
tory negligence in the rescuer recovery context.
122 Furka, 755 F.2d at 1088–89 (citing Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cords v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 672, 683 (Wis. 1977)).
123 Id. at 1089 (quoting Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc., 412 F.2d 1011,
1021 (5th Cir. 1969)).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.; see supra Part I (discussing Maryland Steel and Wagner).
127 See Christopherson, supra note 5, at 651 (“[T]he [Furka] court expressed that the
law should encourage rescue by not imputing negligence on efforts to preserve life unless
those effects are rash or reckless.” (emphasis added) (citing Furka, 755 F.2d at 1089)).
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reckless” standard attached to the maritime rescue doctrine and the rescue
doctrine more broadly.128
Finally, in Wharf v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,129 the Ninth Circuit
issued a short and straightforward opinion affirming Furka’s traditional
approach to the rescue doctrine.  While not a maritime case, its express reli-
ance upon Furka establishes it as a pro-“wanton and reckless” member of the
aforementioned circuit split.130  In the case, Lonnie L. Wharf sued his
employer, Burlington Northern Railroad, on a Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA) claim.131  Mr. Wharf’s left hand was injured when he attempted
to free a co-worker, Mr. Puhek, from frozen ballast in a railroad car.132  Mr.
Wharf argued his injury occurred during an active rescue operation insti-
gated by Burlington Northern’s negligence.133  Affirming the district court’s
findings that Mr. Wharf could not be held liable for his own injuries, Judge
Charles E. Wiggins of the Ninth Circuit summarily concluded that “[t]he res-
cue doctrine applies as a matter of law.”134  Citing Furka, Judge Wiggins con-
tinued by stating that “no comparative fault may be assessed against the
rescuer unless his or her conduct in performing the rescue was wanton or
reckless.”135
Viewed collectively, Grigsby, Furka, and Wharf strongly militate against an
abrogation of a “wanton or reckless” standard within admiralty law’s mari-
time rescue doctrine, and, to varying extents, rescue doctrine law more
broadly.  In Barlow v. Liberty Maritime Corp.,136 however, the Second Circuit
declined to apply Furka, thus leading to a split between itself and the Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.  In Barlow, third-mate George Barlow was injured
when he attempted to prevent his employer’s ship, the Liberty Sun, from
detaching from its mooring lines.137  Specifically, as Mr. Barlow was attempt-
ing to “bump[ ] the brake” in hopes of slackening the line, the line “paid out
uncontrollably,” striking Mr. Barlow and wounding him.138  Mr. Barlow
argued that because his injuries resulted from an attempt to rescue the Lib-
erty Sun, a rescue attempt necessary because of his employer’s negligence, he
was entitled to a jury instruction on the maritime rescue doctrine along with
its “wanton and reckless” standard.139  Thus, Mr. Barlow claimed that the
128 See id. at 661 (“If given the occasion, the Fourth Circuit likely would not limit the
Furka holding, as rescue should be encouraged on all terrain.”).
129 60 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 1995).
130 See Standard of Care, supra note 23, at 150.
131 Wharf, 60 F.3d at 633.
132 Id. at 634.
133 Id. at 633.
134 Id. at 635.
135 Id. (emphases added) (citing Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 759 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th
Cir. 1985); Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1088 (4th Cir. 1985)).
136 746 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2014).
137 Id. at 521–22.
138 Id. at 522.
139 Id. at 522–23.
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district court erred by instructing the jury that if it found he acted unreasona-
bly under emergency circumstances, his recovery could be docked.140
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Wesley began by discussing judi-
cial development of rescue doctrine as a mechanism aimed at shielding
injured rescuers from contributory negligence’s harsh effects.141  Noting Bar-
low’s request that the Second Circuit follow Furka and adopt its application
of a “wanton and reckless” standard, Judge Wesley pointed out that this case
“squarely presented . . . the question of whether to follow Furka.”142  Begin-
ning to answer this pivotal question, Judge Wesley turned to admiralty and
maritime law’s traditional application of principles of comparative fault “in
resolving competing claims of negligence,” in order to argue that application
of such principles was historically appropriate in cases such as Mr. Bar-
low’s.143  Then, addressing both ex post and ex ante concerns, he stated,
“Under comparative negligence, of course, even a negligent rescuer can
recover, as Barlow did here.  Consequently, the principal justification for the
rescue doctrine—encouraging rescue—has largely disappeared.”144  Lastly,
after examining precedent (including Wagner) that he believed had also
applied a reasonableness standard to questions of rescuer recovery,145 Judge
Wesley addressed Mr. Barlow’s final claim that “unique perils of life at sea
favor the Furka standard.”146  In dismissing this assertion, Judge Wesley wrote
that while “[i]t is true that life at sea is generally more dangerous than life on
land . . . that is no reason to adopt Barlow’s rule.”147  Thus, the court explic-
itly declined to follow Furka, instead adopting a “reasonable mariner
standard.”148
B. Rough Waters: Why a Recklessness Standard for Rescuer Recovery Is
Particularly Important in a Maritime Context
Grigsby, Furka, and Wharf contrast starkly with Barlow regarding the
appropriate governing standard for analyzing whether a rescuer may recover
in full for his injuries, setting up an unresolved split in authority.  In light of
Part I’s argument that an examination of relevant case law militates against
abrogation of the rescue doctrine’s “wanton or reckless” standard, this Note
argues that doing so in a maritime context would be undesirable as well.
140 Id. at 523.
141 Id. at 524 (“Under the [rescue] doctrine, defendants asserting the defense of con-
tributory fault were required to show that a rescuer acted not just negligently, but reck-
lessly, thus providing additional leeway to claims of rescuers.” (citing COMM. ON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., NEW
YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 2:41 (3d ed. 2009))).
142 Id. at 525.
143 Id. at 525–26.
144 Id. at 526.
145 Id. at 526–27; see also supra note 52.
146 Id. at 527.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 527–28.
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This Part will now address a few aspects of admiralty and maritime law ren-
dering such an abrogation particularly problematic: (a) admiralty law’s his-
torical commitment to mandating or at least strongly incentivizing third-party
rescue operations against a background no-duty rule; (b) some of its relevant
statutory schemes requiring rescue operations; and (c) the remote locations
in which many maritime rescues take place.  These reasons collectively favor
a traditional “wanton or reckless” standard for rescuer recovery.
From its earliest inception, admiralty law has exhibited a customary and
distinctive preference for encouraging and honoring rescue and salvage
attempts.149  For “[t]he universal custom of the sea demands as much wher-
ever human life is in danger.”150  This “universal custom” animating its juris-
prudence, maritime law has entrenched its preference for incentivizing
rescue in a variety of statutory and common law legal frameworks in an effort
to ensure those in peril have a maximal opportunity to receive aid and
assistance.
In 1897, the Comite Maritime International was founded; and by 1902,
the Comite had organized two conferences, one in Paris and another in
Hamburg.151  Between 1905 and 1910, four sessions were held in Brussels in
which members of each conference came together to draft an international
salvage convention based upon findings from Paris and Hamburg.152  The
result was the 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention, which in relevant part states:
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to
his vessel, her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even
though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.
The owner of the vessel incurs no liability by reason of contravention of
the foregoing provision.153
The Salvage Convention entered into force in the United States on
March 1, 1913, approximately two and a half years after its signing in Brus-
sels.154  The Convention’s original text, particularly that of Article 11 above,
evinces a strong commitment to maritime rescue, requiring a ship’s captain
to render aid to “everybody,” even “an enemy” that is in danger at sea.155
149 See Robert D. Peltz, Adrift at Sea: The Duty of Passing Ships to Rescue Stranded Seafarers,
38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 363, 367 (2014) (“[T]he moral obligation to rescue a distressed vessel
has been long recognized in international maritime sources . . . .”); Andrew A. Braun,
Note, The Maritime Duty of Rescue: Beyond Contract and Privity—Walsh v. Zuisei Kaiun K.K., 5
MAR. L. 81, 87 (1980) (discussing the “universal custom of the sea” and “special solicitude”
afforded by the maritime law in the context of rescue operations); supra text accompany-
ing note 109.
150 Harris v. Pa. R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1931).
151 Patrick J. Long, Comment, The Good Samaritan and Admiralty: A Parable of a Statute
Lost at Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 591, 594 (2000).
152 Id.
153 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Sal-
vage at Sea, art. 11, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T. S. 576.
154 Assistance and Salvage at Sea, Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0780.pdf.
155 Id.
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The version ratified by the United States exhibits a similarly forceful commit-
ment, with language requiring a ship’s master to “render assistance to any
individual found at sea in danger of being lost,” or face up to a $1000 fine or
a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years.156  Similar language can be
found in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Article
98 of the Convention provides that “[e]very State shall require the master of
a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the
ship, the crew or the passengers: to render assistance to any person found at
sea in danger of being lost.”157
The aforementioned international conventions reveal admiralty law’s
longstanding commitment to incentivizing, and in some cases mandating,
bystander rescue operations.  Specifically, recognizing how perilous life at sea
can be, nations of many stripes came together to draft conventions aimed at
cultivating legal frameworks amenable to rescue operations.  Admittedly,
these conventions specifically concern salvage operations, which are a nar-
rower, more distinct form of maritime rescue operation when compared with
a broader range of scenarios likely to implicate traditional, tort law maritime
rescue doctrine principles.158  Nevertheless, they speak to a broader, original
concern ubiquitous in admiralty law, namely that legal frameworks should
not effectively deter would-be rescuers from aiding those in peril as long-
standing maritime traditions demand.  In a 1976 opinion, Judge Gerard
Goettel of the Southern District of New York captured this fundamental ori-
entation towards rescue:
The sea is a hard master and those who sail her are united in a common
struggle.  It is their tradition to answer calls of distress regardless of cost or
peril.  So firmly accepted is this tradition that our laws make it a criminal
offense to ignore those “at sea in danger of being lost.”159
This intrinsic aspect of admiralty jurisprudence has asserted itself time
and time again in a variety of scenarios.  Courts have repeatedly recognized
“[t]he strong policy inherent in maritime law to encourage rescue by
rewarding those who rise to the call and punishing those who do not.”160
For example, in Hunley v. ACE Maritime Corp., Judge Nelson of the Ninth
156 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (2012).
157 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (emphasis added).
158 Within admiralty law, salvage operations constitute a narrow species of maritime
rescue operation.  Specifically, “[s]alvage is defined as the rescue of any ship, cargo or
other recognized subject of salvage (e.g. property, life, and treasure) from danger at sea.”
Jason Parent, Note, No Duty to Save Lives, No Reward for Rescue: Is That Truly the Current State
of International Salvage Law?, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 87, 89 (2006).  Thus, certain
operations falling under the ambit of the maritime rescue doctrine would not be impli-
cated by the salvage conventions discussed in this Note.  However, the larger concerns
surrounding incentivizing maritime rescue operations are quite relevant.
159 Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 418 F.
Supp. 656, 656–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1926) (current version at 46
U.S.C. § 2304 (2012))).
160 Peltz, supra note 149, at 378.
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Circuit noted that “the law of admiralty has always sought to ‘encourage and
induce men of the sea to go to the aid of life and property in distress.’”161
Similarly, in Caminiti v. Tomlinson Fleet Corp., Judge Thomas D. Lambros
wrote:
[T]he law of the sea has always demanded a higher degree of care, vigilance
and diligence.  Accordingly, while it is true that the law of the land may not
generally recognize a “Good Samaritan” rule which requires a person to
come to the aid of a stranger in peril, such a duty is easily found in the
context of admiralty.162
The moralistic, transformative language utilized in Hunley and Caminiti
corresponds well with language used in early rescue doctrine cases such as
Eckert, Maryland Steel, and Wagner.  As in Wagner, where Justice Cardozo’s con-
cern was transcending static tort law rules to ensure would-be rescuers would
have a legitimate opportunity to be made whole,163 Hunley and Caminiti
accentuate admiralty law’s unique proclivity for encouraging (or even man-
dating) rescue operations as support for why its rules, which might run afoul
of certain land-based principles, are appropriate in a maritime realm.164
Thus, just as Justice Cardozo’s language in Wagner characterized the rescue
doctrine as a broader, tort law carve-out aimed at protecting would-be rescu-
ers, Hunley and Caminiti seem to hint at a maritime “carve-out,” which delib-
erately rejects particular intricacies of tort law that would thwart its broader
commitment to incentivizing rescue.  Thus, like Cardozo in Wagner,165
Hunley and Caminiti appear to assume a welfarist approach to common law,
intending that its judicially created structures take root in fundamental, time-
honored communal (here, maritime) mores and traditions.  Indeed, an ele-
mental “axiom of tort law tacitly recognizes that the continued vitality of the
common law, including the law of torts, depends upon its ability to reflect
contemporary community values and ethics.”166
Far from relegating bedrock rescue principles of maritime law to com-
mon law, Congress has codified such mores in a couple of iterations.  Follow-
ing the Titanic’s sinking in 1912, Congress enacted 46 U.S.C. § 728, which
assumes a substantial portion of its language from the 1910 Brussels Salvage
Convention, though differing in some other material respects.167  Essentially,
it provides for liability if a vessel fails to render aid that it could reasonably
give, without endangering itself, to any person at sea in danger of being
lost.168  Today, 46 U.S.C. § 728 has been incorporated into 46 U.S.C. § 2304,
161 927 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 759 F.2d
1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985)).
162 1981 A.M.C. 201, 205 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
163 See supra text accompanying note 52.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 161–62.
165 See supra text accompanying note 53.
166 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (citing BENJA-
MIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 24–25, 108 (1921)).
167 Peltz, supra note 149, at 371.
168 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1926).  The full text of the statute provides:
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which was enacted in 1983.169  Viewed collectively, these statutes are indica-
tive of Congress’s historical and longstanding affirmation of international
maritime law’s widely recognized preference for incentivizing and even man-
dating rescue operations.  Specifically, 46 U.S.C. § 728 and eventually 46
U.S.C. § 2304 gave congressional “bite to the Convention’s bark,” by
“offer[ing] a concrete criminal sanction for a shipmaster’s nonfeasance.”170
In fact, by some measures, said statutes went even further than the Conven-
tion, for example, by not including a disclaimer of liability for the vessel
owner.171
Consistent with its statutory text, purpose, and context, many district
courts have assessed liability under 46 U.S.C. § 2304 when a vessel has failed
to rescue stranded seafarers when it could reasonably have done so.172
Caminiti,173 mentioned earlier in a common law context, found 46 U.S.C.
§ 728 to be an equally plausible basis for liability.  Finding that “[t]he univer-
sal custom of the sea demands as much wherever human life is in danger,”
the Caminiti court concluded that “implicit and inherent in general maritime
law [is] a duty to rescue strangers in peril.”174  It then went on to conclude
that “Section 728 . . . says as much in clear words.”175 Martinez v. Puerto Rico
Marine Management, Inc.,176 is another leading case in which statutory law was
applied to assess liability for a failure to rescue.  In Martinez, Hoyt Dixon and
Denny Jones perished at sea during an attempt by the crew of the SS Ponce
to rescue them from their shrimp boat, the Joan J. II.177  The court found
that Dixon and Jones died as a result of a poorly conducted rescue attempt
The master or person in charge of a vessel shall, so far as he can do so without
serious danger to his own vessel, crew, or passengers, render assistance to every
person who is found at sea in danger of being lost; and if he fails to do so, he
shall, upon conviction, be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $1,000 or imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.
Id.
169 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (2012).  The statute begins:
A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render assistance to any individ-
ual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the master or individual in
charge can do so without serious danger to the master’s or individual’s vessel or
individuals on board.”  It then goes on to provide that “[a] master or individual
violating this section shall be fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not
more than 2 years, or both.
Id. § 2304(b).
170 Parent, supra note 158, at 106.
171 Peltz, supra note 149, at 371 (“Because Congress is deemed to have been aware of
the Convention’s language when it enacted its subsequent statute, the omission of the
disclaimer of liability for the owner must be considered intentional.”).
172 Id. at 373.
173 Caminiti v. Tomlinson Fleet Corp., 1981 A.M.C. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
174 Id. at 206 (quoting Harris v. Pa. R.R. Co., 50 F.2d 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1931)).
175 Id. (emphasis added).
176 Martinez v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt. Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
177 Id. at 1002.
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on the SS Ponce.178  Turning to the Ponce’s liability, the court concluded
that “[w]here a maritime rescue is involved, section 2304 of Title 46 of the
United States Code imposes a duty to provide assistance at sea.”179  Conclud-
ing that Puerto Rico Marine Management owed a duty to the Joan J. II to
provide rescue assistance, the court summarily concluded that the SS Ponce
breached that duty and thus could be held liable under 46 U.S.C. § 2304.180
These decisions, among others,181 reveal district courts’ willingness to
impose liability—both as a matter of statutory and common law—when a ves-
sel fails to carry out its duty to rescue in accord with maritime law’s most
honorable traditions.
While both international maritime law and American statutory law
evince a clear preference for incentivizing and even mandating maritime res-
cue operations, some important objections exist.  First, it cannot be ignored
that such a framework seems inapposite next to American tort law’s auton-
omy-focused, no-duty-to-rescue rule.182  Specifically, common law imposes no
affirmative duty upon a willing Good Samaritan,183 so why should admiralty
law exceed tort law’s libertarian bounds?  Despite its considerable weight,
such an argument fails to account for admiralty law’s historic preference for
rescuers and rescue operations.  The court in Caminiti said as much when it
stated that “the law of the sea has always demanded a higher degree of care,
vigilance and diligence.”184  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit stated in Furka that
“[t]he best traditions of seafaring men demand that we honor attempts to
rescue.”185  Indeed, admiralty law jurisprudence is rich with such
affirmations.
However, some scholars would debate whether admiralty law itself has
always exhibited such a clear preference.  Salvage law, for example, was tradi-
tionally concerned only with property and not human life as is evidenced by
an 1840 American decision, The Emblem, in which the majority held that “a
court of admiralty has no authority to allow a reward merely for the saving of
life.”186  As such, some argue that results emanating from Brussels’ 1910 Sal-
vage Convention, as well as 46 U.S.C. §§ 728 and 2304, are simply inconsis-
tent with traditional principles of salvage as articulated by early case law.187
178 Id. at 1006.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Langston v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., No. 85-2696, 1987 WL 25097 (E.D.
La. Nov. 20, 1987).
182 See Long, supra note 151, at 596 (“By imposing an affirmative obligation on sailors
to rescue those in peril, this statute runs counter to the resilient tort distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance.”).
183 Id.
184 1981 A.M.C. 201, 205 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (emphasis added).
185 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1089 (4th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis added).
186 The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611, 612 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434).
187 See Long, supra note 151, at 600 (“[I]n truth, American admiralty never imposed a
duty to rescue.”).
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Such an argument presents a strong counterweight against claims asserting
admiralty law has always exhibited a clear preference for incentivizing life
rescue.
It is largely uncontroverted that early (pre-Brussels) American admiralty
law imposed no affirmative duty upon salvors to save; however, this does not
wholly undermine admiralty law’s high degree of regard for would-be rescu-
ers.  While traditional precepts of American salvage law suggest admiralty’s
preference for rescuers is not absolute, such claims must be viewed against
salvage law’s own inherently self-limiting framework.  Specifically, as salvage
law’s compensatory benefits are at least in part tethered to a saved piece of
property’s economic value,188 it would be a difficult, quasi-arbitrary enter-
prise to attempt to fix an appropriate level of compensation for life salvage.
As an 1859 case, The Mulhouse, points out, “[i]ndeed, if no property is saved,
no means are supplied by which the court can reward the salvor.”189  Thus,
salvage law’s more limited focus on property “rescue,” at least in part, seems
to have arisen from its own compensation-based system’s effective limits.
Recognizing said gap in salvage law’s framework, Congress passed the Salvage
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 728 (now 46 U.S.C. § 2304), and in doing so affirmed life
rescue as a vital requirement in admiralty law.190  While courts have not
always enforced § 2304 in a uniform manner,191 its text and purpose provide
a clear pathway for liability when would-be salvors fail to aid imperiled seafar-
ers.  Finally, while not binding on American courts, international salvage law
does recognize life salvage and provides appropriate compensation for it.192
This further underscores admiralty law’s preference for encouraging life res-
cue and rescue in general.
Ultimately, this Note’s focus is on neither salvage law’s historical devel-
opment nor its structural intricacies.  However, salvage law’s dynamic evolu-
tion—from its historical-constructural limitation to property salvage, to the
1910 Brussels Salvage Convention, to Congress’s responsive, remedial enact-
ment of 46 U.S.C. §§ 728 and 2304—readily evinces admiralty law’s charac-
teristic commendation of maritime rescue operations.  Such fundamental
principles of admiralty law are freely transferable from salvage law to mari-
time rescue doctrine scenarios.  In both cases, admiralty law should, in
accord with “the best traditions of seafaring men,” strive to incentivize and
compensate life rescue.  Admittedly, district courts have inconsistently
applied 46 U.S.C. § 2304 and its criminal penalties for failure to engage in
188 See id. at 601 n.83.
189 17 F. Cas. 962, 967 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9910).
190 See Parent, supra note 158, at 105–08 (discussing The Salvage Act and other con-
gressional responses to salvage law’s failure to appropriately encourage life salvage or res-
cue in accord with broader principles of admiralty law).
191 See, e.g., Korpi v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 1335, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (conclud-
ing that “[a] private party has no affirmative duty to rescue a vessel or person in distress”).
As some have pointed out, the sporadic enforcement of 46 U.S.C. § 2304 is in part due to
the remoteness and unreported nature of many maritime rescues. See Parent, supra note
158, at 111–12.
192 Parent, supra note 158, at 132–33.
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life rescue; however, this lack of uniform enforcement only underscores why,
in a maritime rescue doctrine context, it is pivotal to retain a framework ame-
nable to private rescue.  Specifically, in light of 46 U.S.C. § 2304’s scattershot
enforcement, would-be rescuers may not feel legally compelled to engage in
life rescue operations, particularly if they may face significant personal liabil-
ity for a negligent (though not wanton or reckless) rescue attempt.  Thus,
allowing a would-be rescuer to recover for his or her potentially serious inju-
ries incurred during a rescue attempt—unless he or she acts in a wanton or
reckless manner—acts as an additional impetus to encourage private rescues.
Additionally, a “wanton or reckless” standard of care better comports with
admiralty law’s holistic structure; for if 46 U.S.C. § 2304 is appropriately
enforced, thus subjecting individuals to potential criminal liability for failure
to engage in life rescue, it makes little sense to simultaneously increase such
individuals’ exposure to potentially significant personal liability under the
maritime rescue doctrine.
One additional aspect of admiralty strongly militating in favor of a lower
threshold for full rescuer recovery under traditional maritime rescue doc-
trine principles stems from admiralty’s nature.  Specifically, by its nature, a
seafarer’s life is solitary, and many maritime rescues unfold in remote,
untraveled locations.  Thus, a third party’s nearby vessel may be an imperiled
victim’s only means of rescue and thus his or her only opportunity for sur-
vival.193  For example, in Hutchinson v. Dickie, a social guest fell off a pleasure
boat and drowned in Lake Erie.194  Issues of premises liability and invitee
status notwithstanding, the Sixth Circuit focused on remoteness as a primary
basis for liability.195  The court noted that rescuing Dickie “was certainly a
moral duty, universally recognized and acted upon.  Dickie was drowning and
appellant’s cruiser was the only instrumentality by which he might be res-
cued.”196  Interpreting Hutchinson, Professor Peter Lake has noted that
“Hutchinson is compatible with a rule requiring rescue at sea whenever one
knows of danger and of another’s imminent peril and controls the only
means of rescue.”197
Considerations of remoteness lend pragmatic force to admiralty law’s
historical preference for incentivizing and honoring private rescue.  If an
imperiled mariner is lucky, a fellow vessel will be near enough to render aid;
and admiralty law, taking account of such potential isolation, has encouraged
and in some cases even impelled private rescue.  Such considerations align
well with Justice Cardozo’s description of rescuers as “deliverer[s]” in Wag-
193 See Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 345 (1997) (“It is powerful ammunition for the argument that a duty
to use at least minimal, if not reasonable, care arises whenever one who can act at minimal
or no risk to himself controls the only instrument of rescue for another who is helpless and
in dire and immediate peril in a remote location.” (footnote omitted)).
194 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947).
195 Lake, supra note 193, at 344 (quoting Hutchinson, 162 F.2d at 106).
196 Hutchinson, 162 F.2d at 106 (emphasis added).
197 Lake, supra note 193, at 344.
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ner.198  Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines savior, a synonym of deliverer,
as “one that saves from danger or destruction.”199  This definition, coupled
with its context in Wagner, evokes a strongly moralistic response, and one that
is echoed by Judge Hicks in Hutchinson.  As Professor Lake writes, “[t]his
feature of the boat-rescue cases is instructive to other, non-boat cases.  It sug-
gests that a more humanitarian system encourages rescue with duty and for-
gives many failed rescues attempts through immunity.”200  Thus, remoteness
considerations provide a boost to humanitarian arguments made in favor of
cultivating legal frameworks amenable to incentivizing rescue operations in a
maritime context.  From such a perspective, abrogating the maritime rescue
doctrine’s traditional “wanton or reckless” standard becomes even more
problematic, and doing so should be discouraged in light of admiralty law’s
writ large policy aims.
III. PAVING THE PATH TO RESCUE
Parts I and II of this Note focused on precedential, historical, and struc-
tural reasons why abrogating the “wanton or reckless” standard traditionally
associated with the rescue doctrine would be problematic, particularly in a
maritime rescue context.  Additionally, Parts I and II highlighted important
policy forces militating against such an abrogation.  Part III will briefly dis-
cuss two particular policy considerations in greater detail in order to shed
further light on negative consequences likely to result from making it more
difficult for voluntary, private rescuers to recover fully for injuries sustained
during rescue attempts.  First, this Note has made frequent reference to the
rescue doctrine as a tool for incentivizing private rescues.  Thus, it is neces-
sary to analyze precisely how rescue doctrine principles act to catalyze and
encourage private rescue attempts as well as evaluate their efficacy in doing
so.  Second, an economic and political concern ubiquitous throughout tort
law asks how legal frameworks do and should affect allocation of costs stem-
ming from accidents and other emergency scenarios.  Thus, this Part will also
briefly examine how costs emanating from private rescues might be allocated
efficiently and fairly.
A simple example helps to delineate what perils and risks a potential
rescuer may face should he or she decide to render aid to an imperiled vic-
tim amidst a regime of comparative negligence.  Take Cords v. Anderson, a
case in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied principles of compara-
tive negligence in lieu of a “wanton or reckless” standard when assessing Ms.
Jane Cords’ ability to recover for injuries she sustained while attempting to
rescue her friend, Norina Boyle.201  A formerly athletic University of Wiscon-
sin sophomore, Ms. Cords’ crippling injuries left her a paraplegic with little
198 Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921).
199 Savior, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004), http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/savior.
200 Lake, supra note 193, at 346–47 (footnote omitted).
201 259 N.W.2d 672 (Wis. 1977).
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to no bowel and bladder control.202  In determining appropriate damages,
the Cords jury concluded that Ms. Cords was partially responsible for her inju-
ries and her damages.203  Thus, in line with principles of comparative negli-
gence, her damages were docked accordingly.204  While Ms. Cords did
receive a $300,000 general damages award, she was still unable to recover
fully for her life-altering injuries.205
Cords draws attention to a troubling quandary facing any would-be res-
cuer who must make a snap decision as to whether to aid an imperiled victim.
Specifically, if mere unreasonableness as it is defined by traditional tort law
principles is enough to reduce a would-be rescuer’s recovery in accord with
comparative negligence, it becomes a significantly riskier enterprise to
render aid to one in need.  Turning to a simplified example, if would-be
rescuer A engages in a rescue operation and incurs serious and crippling
injuries with a “value” of $1,000,000; and, subsequently, a court finds he or
she was two percent responsible for his or her injuries, rescuer A may still be
out some $20,000.  It is very difficult to envision such a result being satisfac-
tory to said rescuer A.  Thus, the Sweetman court’s observation that it “per-
ceive[d] no harsh result from the application of comparative negligence
principles to rescue cases” seems tenuous at best,206 for it is hard to charac-
terize $20,000 in expenses, lasting functional impairment, and significant
emotional and psychological distress as not “harsh” in any manner.
Given this, numerous scholars have cited incentivizing rescue as a key
impetus behind judicial development of a rescue doctrine along with imple-
mentation of its associated “wanton or reckless” standard governing claims
for rescuer injuries.  Delving deeper, application of a “wanton or reckless”
standard acts to encourage rescue by “adopt[ing] a bright-line rule to pro-
vide more rigid and certain legal protection for the rescuer.”207  Specifically,
unless an injured rescuer’s conduct has crossed a certain threshold—namely,
a recklessness threshold—he or she will not be barred from complete recov-
ery.  Thus, less ambiguity exists as to whether a rescuer will be able to
recover.  Also, a greater likelihood exists that a would-be rescuer will, in fact,
recover more fully.  Theoretically, at least, such added protections make it
more likely that a would-be rescuer will engage in a rescue operation when
compared with a regime lacking such buffers.208
Interestingly, some have criticized the rescue doctrine on grounds that it
fails to go far enough.  Such scholars argue it fails to incentivize private res-
202 Id. at 685.
203 Id. at 682–83.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 685–86.
206 Sweetman v. State Highway Dep’t, 357 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(emphasis added).
207 William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 49
U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1127 (2001).
208 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing empirical concerns surround-
ing this proposition).
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cue sufficiently because it forces a rescuer to make a determination as to
whether it will apply in any given case—i.e., it forces a rescuer to determine
whether a victim’s injuries resulted from negligence (rescue doctrine
applies) or merely from an act of nature (rescue doctrine does not apply).209
Another potential criticism would be that application of rescue doctrine prin-
ciples merely restores an injured rescuer to his or her ex ante financial posi-
tion without providing any meritorious reward.  This is a difficult pill to
swallow in light of potentially crippling functional and emotional injuries.
However, such criticisms only underscore why—at the least—it is so impor-
tant to retain a “wanton or reckless” standard when applying rescue doctrine
principles.  To be sure, legislatures should strive to implement other, more
efficient means of compensating rescuers for injuries suffered;210 however,
such efforts will undoubtedly take time and resources.  It would be unwise to
take a step backwards in the interim.
At this point, it is important to address a couple of key objections.  First,
it might be argued that a goal of incentivizing private rescue is not without
significant policy concerns in its own right.  Specifically, what consequences
might arise from incentivizing poorly performed or suboptimal rescues?
Would an imperiled victim be better off if such a rescue were not attempted
on his or her behalf?  Might such an imperfect rescue lead an imperiled vic-
tim to suffer additional injuries or fail to prevent significant injuries alto-
gether?  In his work, Christopher H. White offers a concrete example to help
shed light on precisely what “choice” an individual in need of rescue actually
faces.  White notes:
If Person 2 is the only person capable of rescuing Person 1, then the alterna-
tive to an imperfect rescue is not a perfect rescue, but no rescue at all.  Thus,
Person 1 does not face a choice between costs of zero or (n)(X), but rather a
choice between costs of (n)(X) or X.  In this case, Person 1 prefers the
imperfect rescue that reduces his injuries, but does not eliminate them.211
White’s observations hold particular force in a maritime context, where
the issues of remoteness discussed in Part II are especially likely to arise.  In
essence, an imperiled mariner may truly have only one—if he or she is
lucky—avenue of rescue available.  Such a “deliverer,” to borrow Justice Car-
dozo’s terminology, should not be deterred from engaging in a rescue opera-
tion as a result of a heightened risk for personal liability emanating from
abrogation of the maritime rescue doctrine’s “wanton or reckless” standard
for rescuer recovery.
209 See White, supra note 16, at 524–25 (“Under both Pifer and Williams [two fire rescue
cases], a potential rescuer must make a determination at the scene as to whether a fire has
been negligently started or not.  This is impossible.”).
210 Christopher H. White examines an excellent body of suggestions in his work.  In it,
he analyzes three potential avenues that individual states could implement to provide
redress to injured rescuers.  He looks at “(1) allowing the rescuer to sue the rescued victim
in tort, (2) creating a public compensation fund, or (3) creating an insurance regime.” See
id. at 530–45.
211 Id. at 519.
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One additional objection has to do not with any theoretical issues but
rather with a lack of empirical evidence.  Specifically, it is difficult to find
empirical support for the maritime rescue doctrine’s efficacy in incentivizing
rescue.212  The precise contours of this quandary are beyond this Note’s
scope; however, it raises important pragmatic questions implicating issues of
legal literacy and quick, pressured decisionmaking that are ripe for further
investigation.
The nature of rescue operations as being comprised of reactive, often
gut-level and emotionally driven actions also raises vexing issues surrounding
proper allocation of costs.  Ubiquitous throughout tort law, concerns over
proper allocation of costs emanating from accidents are a focal point of a
law-and-economics approach to tort policy.  While it is far beyond this Note’s
scope to consider cost allocation issues deeply, it is necessary to consider how
rescue-focused laws impact upon such considerations.  At its core, an eco-
nomic approach to tort law demands that policymakers conceptualize and
implement tort law as a tool for both reducing the cost of accidents in the
aggregate and for keeping avoidance costs low.213  In the rescuer-rescued
context, such a framework poses complex questions in light of a rescue’s
reactive nature.
As Christopher H. White accentuates in his work, an individual jumping
to rescue another imperiled individual does not engage in a robust rational
calculus before acting.214  Instead, such decisions are driven by emotional,
psychological, and outright altruistic motivations, motivations quite distinct
from a traditional economic focus on maximization of material self-inter-
est.215  This deviation from traditional approaches to decision-making places
rescuers in an unusual position relative to an economic-focused tort law
framework.  For traditionally, an economic conception of tort law asks
whether a precaution, which could prevent negligent activity and any resul-
tant injuries, is both rational and cost-justified.216  Stating it quite simply,
economists accept a precaution as rational only if it is cost-justified, and a
precaution is cost-justified only if its expected cost is less than that of an
expected injury.217  Examining White’s paradigmatic rescue scenario in
which Person 1 needs rescue and Person 2 is a potential rescuer, one can see
how rescue operations uniquely impinge upon traditional tools for allocating
212 See Stevenson, supra note 57, at 1536.
213 See Jules Coleman et al., Theories of the Common Law of Torts, in THE STANFORD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/tort-theories/#TheTorLawEcoAna.
214 See White, supra note 16, at 515 (“Given the current legal regime’s economic disin-
centives for rescues, it is surprising that Americans ever act to help others.  Yet ordinary
people continue to come to the assistance of others in danger.  This suggests strongly that
people do not act as strictly rational actors in the traditional economic sense of maximizing
their own material self-interests when confronted with a rescue situation.” (footnotes
omitted)).
215 See id.
216 See Coleman et al., supra note 213, § 2.1.
217 Id.
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accident costs.218  As White articulates, in a socially optimal world, Person 2
will intervene to aid Person 1 when and if his cost of intervening, Y, is less
than Person 1’s cost of remaining in need of rescue, X.219  The disparity,
however, is that Person 2 does not directly suffer Person 1’s costs and thus
will act when Y is less than Z, a variable representative of Person 2’s intrinsic
benefit.220  As noted earlier, Person 2’s intrinsic benefit may very well be dif-
ficult to quantify in a pecuniary manner; instead, it often assumes an emo-
tional or psychological character.  Thus, an overall disconnect exists, in
which Person 2 does not account for X in his or her decision, and society fails
to account for Z in determining its optimal outcome.221
For this Note’s purpose, it suffices to articulate a crucial result from such
a discrepancy.  Specifically, if legislatures, policymakers, or even courts allo-
cate costs in a manner likely to increase Y, a rescuer’s cost of intervening,
would-be rescuers will be less likely to intervene owing to an unfavorable risk-
reward calculus.  Thus, from an angle geared toward incentivizing maritime
rescue and rescue more broadly, lawmakers should strive to lower Y and raise
or honor Z, a would-be rescuer’s intrinsic benefit.222  Here, abrogating a
“wanton or reckless” standard in favor of a reasonable mariner standard in
assessing a rescuer’s ability to recover for injuries sustained during a volunta-
rily entered into rescue attempt raises Y by making it more likely a rescuer
will not recover in full for injuries suffered.  It also fails to honor Z in that it
does not adequately recognize a rescuer’s altruistic motives for acting.  Thus,
put simply, a would-be rescuer is less likely to attempt to rescue.  Therefore, a
“wanton or reckless” standard more appropriately facilitates attainment of
both of Justice Cardozo’s considerations in Wagner—that ex post, a rescuer
has a legitimate opportunity to recover in full, and that ex ante, individuals
are incentivized to engage in rescue operations for society’s broader bene-
fit.223  Such considerations only grow more forceful in a maritime context
owing to its unique historical, statutory, and policy-based aspects.224  Given
that allocating costs in a manner that places prohibitive barriers in a rescuer’s
path makes it less likely that third-party rescue operations will take place,
doing so is inconsistent with original principles underlying judicial develop-
ment of a rescue doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Note has examined what standard of care a rescuer must exhibit
while carrying out a rescue operation in order to recover for injuries he or
she sustains while rendering aid to an imperiled victim.  This Note has specif-
ically focused on analyzing this question with respect to maritime rescue
218 See White, supra note 16, at 543.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See supra Part I.
224 See supra Part II.
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operations.  Currently, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have retained a
“wanton or reckless” standard for rescuer recovery, while the Second Circuit
has abrogated this “wanton or reckless” standard, instead adopting a “reason-
able seaman” standard based on principles of comparative negligence.
This Note argues that it would be advisable to retain a “wanton or reck-
less” standard in assessing claims for rescuer recovery under the maritime
rescue doctrine.  Part I traced over a century of rescue doctrine–related case
law in order to analyze its relationship to shifting principles of apportion-
ment.  It found that while uncertainty exists as to whether comparative negli-
gence has subsumed the rescue doctrine, an integrated study of relevant case
law militates against such an argument.  Part II then argued that an abroga-
tion of the rescue doctrine and its associated “wanton or reckless” standard
would be particularly ill-advised in an admiralty law context.  Finally, Part III
delved more deeply into how traditional rescue doctrine principles act to
incentivize private rescue in addition to examining how such an application
properly allocates costs under core principles of law and economics.  Retain-
ing traditional maritime rescue doctrine principles—notwithstanding a
framework of comparative negligence—fairly offers injured rescuers a legiti-
mate opportunity to be made whole while simultaneously encouraging
would-be rescuers to aid those in peril, twin benefits potentially applicable to
us all.
This being said, questions about how courts and policymakers might
assess rescuer recovery claims going forward remain unanswered.  This Note
has argued for a “wanton or reckless” standard in assessing rescuer recovery
claims; however, precisely what conduct constitutes a wanton or reckless res-
cue attempt?  Certainly, recklessness requires a higher level of culpability
than a mere negligence standard; but it is equally true that a “wanton or
reckless” standard is not equivalent to absolute immunity for rescuers.  In
essence, at some threshold level, a rescuer will be acting recklessly and face
significantly diminished prospects for recovery.  No bright-line test likely
exists; however, it is worth considering rescue situations in which the negli-
gence-recklessness border is likely to be crossed.  Another question involves
societal costs associated with improperly carried out rescues.  While this
Note’s focus has been on concrete parties and smaller-scale questions of law
and economics relevant to rescue operations, it is also crucial to examine
how incentivizing rescue operations may shift larger-scale, aggregate costs
when rescues are carried out improperly.  Finally, as this Note has pointed
out, rescues are often emotionally driven and reactive in nature.  Meanwhile,
law tends to be very analytical and rational in its character.  Thus, a broader
scale, structural tension is likely to exist between classic legal concepts and
psychological forces motivating an individual to render aid to another in
need.  Ultimately, this friction is unlikely to have a concrete remedy; how-
ever, it is instructive to courts and policymakers in that it reminds them to be
attentive to areas of law ripe for departure from traditional principles.
